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The idea that pictorial art can have cognitive value, that it can enhance our understanding of 
the world and of our own selves, has had many advocates in art theory and philosophical 
aesthetics alike. It has also been argued, however, that the power of pictorial representation to 
convey or enhance knowledge, in particular knowledge with moral content, is not generalized 
across the medium. Thus, in ‘What photographs can’t do’, Stephanie Ross argues that non-
narrative pictures are confined to appearances, and so cannot promote the kind of 
understanding necessary for moral knowledge.1 In what follows I shall argue that Ross’s claim 
relies on an erroneous conception of the way that pictorial representation functions. Pictorial 
representation can be seen to exploit knowledge of the world and of the system of 
representation itself, shared within the generating culture. Given that it is generally not possible 
for an artist to depict all that there is to depict about her chosen subject, artists commonly rely 
on audiences to draw on their knowledge and experience and, thereby, fill-in those aspects of 
pictorial content that are not being given explicitly. Thus, to be rightly appreciated, pictures often 
have to be seen under the light of information that the artist had reasons to regard as shared 
knowledge among the anticipated audience. In the case of non-narrative pictures, as I shall 
illustrate, this interpretive strategy allows pictorial content to expand beyond appearances, 
beyond the spatio-temporal fragment depicted, thus enabling moral function. 
1  Stephanie Ross, ‘What photographs can’t do’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 41, no. 1 
(1982) 
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In her analysis, Ross draws a parallel between photography and (19th century) realist 
painting, and points out that both types of representation depict a time-fragment rather than a 
series of events unfolding in time, and so they have non-narrative structure. That they are thus 
structured, Ross argues, prevents them from being vehicles for moral knowledge: the depiction 
of a single point in time, she contends, confines the meaning of a picture to the appearance 
rather than the essence of things, thus forestalling the understanding that the audience needs in 
order to appreciate the moral character of the represented state of affairs. 
Given that moral properties are not manifest, or at least not in the way that primary qualities 
are, Ross explains that appreciation has to stem from an understanding of the character of the 
situation, action, or event that is being appreciated; which understanding entails consideration of 
the surrounding circumstances and the background conditions: 
 
Moral properties are not visible or immediately apparent like phenomenal ones. Therefore moral 
judgments go beyond appearances. Suppose you see a large adult hit a small child. Have you 
witnessed a wrongdoing, a case of cruelty? You cannot be sure until you know the background: 
perhaps they were playing, perhaps they were practising judo, perhaps the child is horrible and 
fully deserves to be hit. One does not directly see wrongness in seeing acts that are wrong, and 
the very same movements—the same appearance—might earn a gamut of different moral labels, 
given different circumstances.2  
 
To evaluate a certain state of affairs one must understand how the state of affairs came to be; 
one needs to gain ‘a sense of events, causally linked, unfolding in time’,3 as ‘different stories 
yield different evaluations’.4 It is this sort of understanding, typically gained from narrative 
works, that alone can be, for Ross, the source of art’s moral value: art promotes moral 
knowledge not only in conveying moral judgments, but mainly in offering justification for the 
judgments that it conveys in the form of causes, beliefs, and reasons behind the actions and 
events that the judgments are about. 
2  Ross, p. 8 
3  Ross, p. 11 
4  Ross, p. 9 
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That moral knowledge implies (among other things) the possibility of justified moral 
judgment, and that justified judgment is enabled by narrative explanation, is a widely held belief. 
But to get from this belief to the conclusion that a non-narrative picture cannot promote moral 
knowledge, one has to further accept, as Ross apparently does, that non-narrative pictures are 
necessarily confined to appearances. Ross’s argument can be formalized as follows:  
 
a)   Moral knowledge regarding a represented state of affairs, presupposes (through the 
need for justification) understanding of the character of that state of affairs. 
b)   This character is determined through context and background conditions –  the 
circumstances, reasons, actions, attitudes and beliefs which led to that state of affairs. 
c)   The context and background conditions of a represented state of affairs are given only 
in a narrative work. 
d)    Pictures depicting a time fragment do not have a narrative structure. 
e)   Pictures depicting a time fragment do not allow for the possibility of moral knowledge. 
 
Even if one accepts all the premises in Ross’s argument, the conclusion, it seems to me, does 
not follow. For the conclusion to follow, one more premise seems to be needed, namely that the 
only way that an audience can understand the character of a represented state of affairs is via 
narration.  If this implicit premise were valid, and therefore could be openly included in the 
argument, it would follow that non-narrative pictures are necessarily confined to appearances, 
and so, that they cannot promote moral knowledge. But I want to deny this premise: the 
character of a represented state of affairs can be understood without narration of how the state 
of affairs came to be. If this is right, the fact that a picture does not have a narrative structure 
does not entail (not necessarily at least) that the picture is confined to appearances; that it does 
not allow viewers to gain, as Ross argues, any knowledge which requires a sense of events, 
causally linked, unfolding in time. To explain how non-narrative pictures can promote moral 
knowledge, one has to resort to a basic fact about systems of communication, namely the fact 
that shared knowledge of a system of communication and shared knowledge of the world allow 
for economy in discourse. Pragmatic considerations—what an audience knows about the 
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speaker, the subject matter, or the context in which communication takes place—commonly 
mediate discourse and extend meaning beyond the “letter”: beyond what is being conveyed 
explicitly.  
Pictures, both narrative and non-narrative, do not function as autonomous entities: the title of 
a picture, pre-existing texts or events on which the picture may draw, pre-existing pictorial 
works, are all contexts of information on which pictures often rely for their meaning. They all 
provide resources often necessary for accurate interpretation. And there are more such 
contexts: pictures, for instance, commonly rely on iconographic conventions; or they exploit 
shared knowledge about the world that they depict, for instance, the habits, customs, or social 
relations that it involves; or about the context of presentation; or even about the artist, her past 
work or ideology. In that sense, and to that extent, pictures are not self-sufficient entities. And 
they could not be, if only for a very pragmatic reason, implicated in Noel Carroll’s remark on 
narrative works:   
 
No artist can say or depict everything that there is to say or depict about the fictional events she 
is narrating. She depends upon the audience to fill in a great deal and that filling in is an 
indispensable part of what it is to follow and to comprehend a narrative… It is for this reason that 
the successful author requires an audience that can bring to the text, among other things, what is 
not explicit in it. The author designs her work with an implicit working hypothesis about the 
knowledge that her anticipated reader will bring to the text, along with knowledge of how the 
reader will feel toward the characters.5  
 
The same pragmatic constraint seems to govern pictorial representation in general: no artist can 
depict all that there is to depict about her chosen subject. Therefore, pictures are designed with 
an implicit working hypothesis about the knowledge relevant to different public domains that 
anticipated viewers will bring to a picture—for instance, knowledge of society, history, culture, 
politics, the institution of art, or about the system of pictorial representation itself, and the codes 
and practices that it involves. The public domains on which artists draw thus become contexts of 
5  N. Carroll, ‘Art, narrative, and moral understanding’, in Aesthetics and Ethics, ed. J. Levinson 
(Cambridge, 2001), pp. 138-40. 
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information where the meaning of a pictorial representation is encoded, and which viewers 
would have to, and standardly do consider, in order to rightly appreciate a picture.  
So, in responding to pictorial representations we habitually draw on, and are expected by 
artists to draw on, appropriate contexts of information where the meaning of a picture is 
encoded, as in standard cases, and for at least  pragmatic reasons, artists rely on shared 
knowledge relevant to such contexts in the process of production. The claim, put forth by Ross, 
that a picture which aspires to the principle of instantaneity is confined to appearances, and 
therefore cannot promote moral knowledge, relies, I believe, on a mistaken conception of the 
system of pictorial representation.  
To illustrate this point, let us briefly consider Manet’s painting, The Execution of Emperor 
Maximilian of Mexico (1867). Ross regards this painting as a paradigmatic case of a non-
narrative picture. According to Linda Nochlin’s analysis of the painting that Ross quotes, the 
work embodies the realist commitment to contemporaneity: it recreates the appearance of a 
single moment as soldiers fire upon the emperor.6 Realism, Nochlin explains,  
 
destroyed the paradigm of temp oral continuity in favour of the disjointed temporal fragment. This 
emphasis on the temporal fragment as the basic unit of perceived experience… accompanied the 
elimination or reduction of traditional moral values in Realist works.7 
 
But is this a causal connection? Is it the sense of time that realist works employ that diminished 
moral value in such works? Ross argues that it is. The depiction of a single moment, she 
suggests, itself prevents the understanding on which moral knowledge relies. If that were so, 
Manet’s painting, which is clearly non-narrative, should be devoid of moral content. But this is 
not the case. The painting both conveys a judgment on the moral (and political) significance of 
the represented event, and it offers reasons for the judgment that it conveys. But to appreciate 
the moral content of the work the viewer has to be familiar both with cultural and historical facts 
and with the norms of the system of pictorial representation. The painting, as any pictorial 
6  Ross, p. 11  
7  Linda Nochlin, Realism (New York, 1971), p. 31 
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representation, is not (epistemologically) transparent; it is not open to all viewers regardless of 
their perceptual beliefs and epistemic background. Rather it was created for an audience that 
had a certain cognitive stock to bring to their interpretation. The informed viewers would be 
able to fill-in the aspects of represented event that are not given explicitly: their understanding of 
the painting would most certainly expand beyond the depicted time-fragment, beyond 
appearances.  
So, for instance, a viewer that could rely on collective knowledge shared in the western 
culture would most probably recognize in the painting the representation of an execution: the 
uniforms of the firing squad, their  guns, the posture of the subjects, and even the watching 
crowd, are all distinctive characteristics of the situation depicted. To use an expression 
employed by Nochlin, the picture offers ‘a significant kinetic summary’:8 not to implicate 
temporal order or the past, but to specify the character of the represented state of affairs; it 
presents information distinctive of the familiar schema of an execution - familiar to contemporary 
viewers and familiar to us. But in assuming the picture under the schema of an execution we 
already move back in time: such a schema involves that a person is killed as a punishment for 
her actions or beliefs, which presumably have been considered by an authority as against its 
interests and well-being. In recognizing the situation represented as an execution, we assume 
that such are the background conditions of that situation. The painting then does not present a 
disjointed temporal fragment: it implicates a story drawing on collective knowledge, which has 
guided the choices of the artist and guides the interpretation of suitably informed viewers. 
Further, the painting was created in a time and in a place where the depicted execution was a 
major political event. Even if contemporary viewers were not able to identify the characters in 
the picture (from clues such as clothing for instance) the title would unequivocally point them (or 
us) in the right direction. Then, it would be information about the event that the viewers already 
had or were able to gather that would allow them to fill-in what is not being given explicitly: it 
would allow them to reconstruct the implicated narrative. 
More importantly, a viewer familiar with the pictorial art of the time would be able to 
8  Nochlin, p. 30 
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recognize the significance that the artist placed upon the represented event. On the one hand the 
painting has a scale that was at the time reserved for historical and religious subject matter – for 
themes of great importance. Further it actively alludes to Goya’s The third of May 1808, a 
work with which contemporary audiences would have been very familiar, and which would have 
for them a strong moral and political character. The contrast with Goya’s painting conveys the 
thought that the execution of Maximilian was unjust—as was the execution of Spanish 
countrymen by French soldiers that had been so forcefully depicted by Goya. Manet relied on 
the audience’s knowledge of pictorial art—knowledge that they were expected to use in their 
encounter with the picture—in order to accentuate his stance on the moral significance of the 
represented event. But the artist did not do just that: he further provided the audience with an 
explanation behind his stance. Manet did not just condemn the execution of the Emperor, he 
further expressed an indictment on imperialist France via the executioners’ costume (the 
Mexican executioners appear wearing French uniform), which was actually the reason why the 
painting was banned from the Paris Salon. The choice of uniform is here a device for the 
justification of the moral stance that the artist conveys—a device though that can perform its 
function only against the cognitive background that the artist presumed his contemporaries to 
have: a background that involves knowledge of historical fact; of dressing codes; even of the 
regularity in realist painting that wants purposive deviations from actual fact (here the detail of 
costume) to have significance.  
So in the case of The Execution, and counter to Ross’s claim, the sense of time that the 
work employs is not an impediment to moral function: the painting—seen in the light of 
information that the artist had reasons to regard as shared knowledge among the anticipated 
audience—conveys an evaluative perspective on the represented event, but also, and more 
importantly, it offers reasons for that perspective, thus promoting moral knowledge. Ross’s 
objection to the moral value of non-narrative pictures is thus counteracted by the fact that 
pictorial representation does not function as an autonomous system; it commonly exploits 
knowledge that is shared in the generating culture: knowledge about history, society, politics, 
culture, religion, or about the system of representation itself. Supplemented by the appropriate 
information— information about different public domains that the artist anticipated her 
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contemporaries to possess—a picture can transcend appearances; and, when needed, it can 
convey (and perhaps even defend), moral judgments. This, I believe, is the case regardless of 
the sense of time that a picture employs.   
